Version 1.0 · Draft · Owner: Engineering Lead
Download .md →Touch2Sign Ltd
Version: 1.0
Effective date: 11 July 2026
Owner: Robert — Engineering Lead
Approved by: Robert — CEO / Managing Director
Next review: 11 July 2027
Define cryptographic standards and key management practices for protecting Touch2Sign data in transit and at rest. Ensures consistent use of approved algorithms and secure handling of secrets across AWS eu-west-1 (Ireland).
Applies to:
| Use case | Approved | Prohibited | Data at rest | AES-256 (AWS KMS, S3 SSE, RDS encryption) | DES, 3DES, RC4 |
|---|---|---|
| Data in transit | TLS 1.2+ (TLS 1.3 preferred) | SSLv3, TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1 |
| Password hashing | bcrypt, Argon2, or Cognito-managed | MD5, SHA1 for passwords |
| Document integrity | SHA-256 or stronger | MD5 for audit evidence |
| Signing tokens | Cryptographically secure random (CSPRNG) | Predictable sequences |
| Asset | Encryption method | Key management | Amazon S3 (documents, assets) | SSE-S3 or SSE-KMS (AES-256) | AWS-managed or CMK in eu-west-1 |
|---|---|---|
| Amazon RDS (PostgreSQL) | Encryption at rest enabled | AWS KMS |
| RDS backups / snapshots | Inherited from source | AWS KMS |
| EBS volumes | Encrypted | AWS KMS |
| Secrets Manager | Encrypted at rest | AWS KMS |
Customer documents and audit data must not be stored on unencrypted volumes or buckets.
All production secrets are stored in AWS Secrets Manager:
| Requirement | Detail | No secrets in git | .env.local gitignored; pre-commit checks where configured |
|---|---|
| Access | IAM role-based; no secrets in environment variables in source |
| Rotation | Database credentials rotated on schedule or after compromise |
| Audit | CloudTrail logs all GetSecretValue calls |
.env.local files — never committed to repository crypto.randomBytes or equivalent CSPRNG | Phase | Actions | Generation | Use AWS or platform CSPRNG; document purpose and owner |
|---|---|
| Distribution | Via Secrets Manager or IAM role — never email or Slack |
| Use | Least-privilege access; log privileged retrieval |
| Rotation | Scheduled rotation or immediate on compromise — see Incident Response Plan |
| Revocation | Disable old key version; verify no dependent services fail |
| Destruction | KMS key deletion schedule; confirm backups re-encrypted if needed |
On suspected key or secret compromise:
Reviewed annually and after major infrastructure or cryptography-related incidents.
Approval
| Name | Role | Signature | Date | Robert | CEO / Engineering Lead | Electronic | 11 July 2026 |
|---|
Questions: security@touch2sign.com · privacy@touch2sign.com